National Security Decision Directive Number 112
[NSDD No. 112]
PROCESSING AND DISPOSITION OF DOCUMENTS
ACQUIRED BY US FORCES IN GRENADA
[NOTE - THERE ARE Xd-out (letters) at the end of each paragraph, and not entered here; all are marked TS or S; most likely meaning Top Secret or Secret]
The documents acquired by US Forces in Grenada represent a unique resource, which is of significant potential value to US national security interests. It is vital that this resource be protected and carefully utilized to obtain maximum benefit.
Initial assessment of the quality and quantity of the documents suggest that they will add substantially to our detailed understanding of the anatomy of the creation of a Soviet/Cuban third world proxy. It is imperative that we ensure serious, dedicated, and well supported exploitation of this material in order to fully develop that understanding. In addition, it appears that there is a significant amount of intelligence information available in a variety of related areas. Finally, public disclosure of certain of these documents could add to public and allied understanding of this phenomena of Soviet/Cuban foreign policy. Furthermore, it is unlikely that full understanding of what is contained in this archive will not be known until after dedicated analysis of the material. This long tern analysis by the intelligence community could take considerable time.
It is imperative that measures be taken now to ensure full exploitation of all aspects and implications of this material. Therefore, I direct the following actions:
- The immediate protection of all documents obtained in Grenada. Each document will be copied, indexed, and cataloged. The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), shall ensure the assignment of appropriate control procedures, and sufficient resources to accomplish this task expeditiously.
- Questions of the return or further disposition of the documents in this archive shall be considered only after all other issues concerning exploitation and other utilization have been resolved. No documents are to be returned prior to my decision on this matter.
- Within the next three weeks the intelligence community will produce an all source analysis of information obtained from Grenada on two topics: (a) the methods and institutions used by the Grenadan regime to control the population of Grenada from March 13, 1970 to October 24, 1983; and, (b) the methods and organizations used by each of the Soviet Bloc countries, Cuba, North Korea, Libya, and any other non-Grenadan Marxist/Leninist groups to obtain influence in Grenada and use Grenada for the export of subversion. This analysis will be seen as a first look and will provide insight for the larger indepth analysis to be described below.
- An interagency mechanism for intelligence exploitation shall be established. The DCI, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and in particular the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, who has custody of these documents, shall develop a plan for the immediate and long term interdisciplinary and intergeographic intelligence analysis of this material. This review of the archive shall address at a minimum the following considerations, topics, and issue (sic):
- Soviet/Cuban and Bloc modus operandi in developing Grenada as a potential political and military base against US interests.
- Detailed examination of the anatomy of the development of a Soviet/Cuban proxy in the context of lessons for US policy.
- Examination of how the New Jewel movement and the government of Grenada worked together to discredit the US, as well as governments, parties, and individuals friendly to the US in Europe and Central America.
- Full counterintelligence examination of these documents as they relate to the hostile intelligence threat.
- Exploitation of cryptographic materials.
- Careful examination of US classified documents found in the Grenada archive and investigation and exploitation of the sources of these documents.
- Determination of which Central and Latin American, European, and US organizations and persons had been penetrated, controlled or influenced by Soviet/Cuban/Bloc and Grenada.
- Forensic examination of the documents themselves, e.g., the kinds of paper, ink, copy machines, etc., used and what these indicate about the Soviet/Cuban Bloc's modus operandi in political action, active measures, and other intelligence operations.
- Determination of the extent of Grenadian involvement in international drug trafficking.
- An interagency committee for public disclosure and information shall be established under the Secretary of State. It shall develop plans for the short and long term exploitation for public information and political action. This shall include plans to:
- Build broad international understanding and support for the concerns of the Eastern Caribbean countries and use this to project a better understanding for US supportive actions.
- Expose the degree of Soviet/Cuban and Bloc involvement in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.
- Expose the use of Grenada as a base for political action and subversion in the region.
- Demonstrate communist use of Grenada as a means to subvert and manipulate political and regional movements, including the Socialist parties and Socialist International.
- Demonstrate the human rights violations of the Grenada regime and the concomitant Cuban role.
- Develop measures to ensure the credibility of the documents, including access for US scholars and journalists.
[signed Ronald Reagan]
- Copies of all documents identified as having potential value for public exploitation shall be made available to this interagency committee. In accordance with the action plans described above, this committee shall determine which documents should be disclosed and how disclosure should be made, and shall cause necessary implementing actions to be taken. Disclosures shall be coordinated insofar as possible with cooperating regional states (e.g., OECS members, Barbados, Jamaica).
- The Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence, respectively shall provide interim reports on implementation of the NSDD to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs not later than January 1, 1984, and periodically thereafter.
[note - looks like this NSDD 112 could have had additional pages as a possible next page printout says 'EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS']